JOANNA NIWOROWSKI—On October 18, 2019, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ruled in Jones v. DeSantis that the State cannot bar former felons from voting due to their inability to pay fines and other costs associated with their convictions. The Court granted a preliminary injunction, which applies to 17 individuals whose cases were consolidated in this action. The injunction allows the plaintiffs to show a genuine inability to pay and prevents the State from taking any action that would prevent the plaintiffs from voting based solely on their inability to pay.
The issue in Jones v DeSantis emerged from a law passed by the Florida Legislature after the enactment of the so-called “Amendment 4.” In November 2018, Amendment 4 was passed, amending the Florida State Constitution and restoring voting rights to individuals convicted of felonies who had completed all of the terms of their sentence, including parole and probation. The amendment restored the rights of only some former felons—individuals convicted of murder or felony sexual offenses are not qualified for restoration. The voter-approved amendment restored voting rights to about 1.4 million people after passing with 64.55% of the vote and became effective on January 8, 2019.
In response, the Florida Legislature passed SB7066 to implement the amendment. The Court focused on two specific provisions of the statute. Those provisions provided that Amendment 4’s language of “all terms of sentence” includes financial obligations imposed as part of the sentence and financial obligations that the sentencing court converts to a civil lien. In other words, SB7066 effectively barred former felons from voting until they had paid off all fines, fees, and other financial obligations associated with their sentencing.
In considering the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court noted that although states have discretion in restoring voting rights and in choosing the individuals whose rights will be restored, restoration of rights by a state must comply with the U.S. Constitution. The Court stated that “it is clear that a state can deny restoration of a felon’s right to vote based on failure to pay financial obligations in a sentence,” and that it was rational for a state to not restore the vote to a person who is able to pay but chooses not to.
The real question in this case was whether a person’s inability to pay an obligation can be the basis for denying restoration. The Court looked to Johnson v. Governor of Florida, an 11th Circuit case that addressed that very question: whether the State could deny restoration to a felon based on the failure to pay an amount that the felon was unable to pay? The Johnson court stated in a footnote that “[a]ccess to the franchise cannot be made to depend on an individual’s financial resources.”
The Court interpreted Johnson as establishing that the State cannot deny restoration solely based on a felon’s inability to pay financial obligations included in a sentence. The Court went on to say that the State can meet this constitutional obligation by addressing the felon’s lack of financial resources in the same process as through which the felon may obtain restoration or through another method of its choosing. The Court emphasized that all that Johnson requires is that the State implement “an appropriate procedure through which an individual plaintiff may register and vote if otherwise qualified and genuinely unable to pay outstanding financial obligations.” The Court also added that the State may place the burden of establishing inability to pay on the individual.
Thus, the Court held that the State of Florida cannot deny the plaintiffs the right to vote solely on their lack of financial resources to pay financial obligations and enjoined the defendants from interfering with any appropriate procedure established through which the plaintiffs could show their genuine inability to pay.
While this ruling only applies to the individual plaintiffs, groups such as the Campaign Legal Center are already looking to extend this remedy to all former felons who are otherwise eligible for restoration. It is unclear whether the State will appeal this decision or how it will proceed in implementing the necessary procedures. It is clear, however, that action is required to ensure that adequate procedures are implemented so that this group of individuals can, at a minimum, have their right to vote restored. Much can change between now and the trial date set in April, but the ruling is a hopeful first step in bringing about the restoration of voting rights for those who are genuinely restricted by their financial obligations.
