AVERY HALL—In his lecture, “Impoundments and Other Methods of Fiscal Control,” Professor Zachary Price analyzes the history of executive efforts to control federal spending. He situates his discussion in recent history, arguing that the Trump administration’s assertion of spending control has marked a new degree of departure from historical norms. While this tension is not new, Price asserts that the increasing decisions to pause or cancel appropriated funds reflect an escalation in “executive governance.” By centralizing fiscal power within the executive branch, modern administrations have challenged the design that gives Congress the “power of the purse.”
Historical Background
Price began his discussion with the Constitution, citing three clauses created to govern federal spending. First, the Appropriations Clause states that no money may be taken from the Treasury without first receiving congressional authorization. Second, the Take Care Clause requires that the president faithfully execute the laws, abolishing the monarchical “dispensing power” once used to ignore statutory commands. Finally, the Army Appropriations Clause limited military funding to two years, reflecting the framers’ fear of an unaccountable, indefinitely funded army. Together, these provisions illustrate a separation of monetary powers at the heart of the Constitution. Citing Federalist No. 58, Price emphasized James Madison’s view that control of the purse is Congress’s “most complete and effectual weapon” for ensuring both accountability and liberty.
This principle of the “power of the purse” traces back to English history when spending powers belonged solely to the king, causing political unrest. After the English Civil Wars and the Glorious Revolution, the Parliament gained control over taxation and spending. The American colonies mirrored this idea, with elected legislatures holding authority over public funds. The framers of the Constitution, informed by this history, viewed congressional control over funding as an essential safeguard against executive domination akin to a king. Accordingly, the Appropriations, Take Care, and Army Appropriations Clauses were included in the Constitution to ensure that this authority remained with Congress.
In practice, however, early administrations often strayed from the framers’ design. Price noted that even George Washington circumvented formal appropriations during the Whiskey Rebellion, where he diverted army funds to raise a militia and later sought retroactive Congressional approval. Throughout the nineteenth century, federal agencies routinely overspent and sought reimbursement from Congress after the fact, a pattern known as “coercive deficiencies.” Legislators such as John Randolph, who served as a Representative and Senator of Virginia from 1799 to 1829, condemned the practice as undermining fiscal discipline, likening Congress to indulgent grandparents continually asked to cover their dependents’ excesses.
In response to these “coercive deficiencies,” Congress enacted a series of reforms. In passing the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1870, federal officers were prohibited from obligating funds not appropriated by Congress. Under this Act, no obligations could be made without appropriation, stopping agencies from spending or promising money they did not have. Next came the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which required a unified presidential budget, created the Bureau of the Budget to coordinate spending, and established the Comptroller General and General Accounting Office to audit executive accounts. This Act increased presidential control over planning the budget and reinforced congressional oversight power, creating a theoretically effective equilibrium and strengthening the “power of the purse.”
Current Framework
The careful balance curated by the legislatures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was eroded in the latter half of the twentieth century. Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon increasingly used impoundments, or the refusal to spend funds appropriated by Congress, for policy reasons. Nixon went further, claiming constitutional authority to withhold funds. The Justice Department’s William Rehnquist deemed the theory unconstitutional, citing the Take Care Clause, and the Supreme Court agreed. Congress replied with the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which both created the modern budget process and established limits on executive non-spending through the Impoundment Control Act (ICA).
Under the ICA, temporary spending delays, known as deferrals, are permitted only for administrative or contingency reasons and cannot extend beyond the fiscal year, while permanent cancellations, known as rescissions, require congressional approval within forty-five days. If Congress fails to act, the funds must be obligated. Combined with the Anti-Deficiency Act, this framework ensures that agencies cannot spend without authorization and presidents cannot withhold funds unilaterally.
Price – Current Issues
Looking at modern practice, Price explained that recent administrations, particularly under President Trump, have tested the boundaries created by the ICA. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), currently led by Russell Vought and advised by Mark Paoletta, implemented spending freezes that effectively reasserted executive control over appropriations. Though the administration did not claim an explicit impoundment power, Price argued that these actions violated both the ICA and the president’s duty of faithful execution under the Take Care Clause.
Additionally, Price argued that the administration also circumvented the formal rescission process, proposing the cancellation of large sums of approved spending. While technically lawful, Price cautioned that rescissions destabilize Congress’s budgeting power by allowing the executive to reopen bipartisan appropriations with only a simple majority vote, circumventing the Senate filibuster and weakening the legislative consensus obtained when appropriations are passed.
The most troubling development, according to Price, was the rise of the “pocket rescission.” By submitting rescission proposals less than forty-five days before the fiscal year’s end, OMB could freeze funds until they expired. This effectively nullifies appropriations without congressional approval. This maneuver inverts the ICA’s purpose, turning a statutory check into a tool for unilateral cancellation. Lower courts found the tactic unlawful, but the Supreme Court held that only the Comptroller General could bring enforcement actions, leaving oversight to political, rather than judicial, remedies.
Finally, Price noted that injured parties may seek compensation in the Court of Federal Claims, yet that court’s jurisdiction extends only to monetary relief and cannot compel spending. As a result, judicial enforcement remains limited, and Congress’s oversight, which is often weakened by partisanship, remains the only meaningful check.
Conclusion
Price concluded where he began, emphasizing that the framers placed spending power in Congress’s hands to ensure a degree of executive dependence. Yet, across two centuries, executive ambition has diminished that foundation. Safeguards, such as the Anti-Deficiency Act and the ICA, can preserve balance only if Congress and the courts enforce them. If they fail to act, fiscal discretion will continue to consolidate in the presidency. For Price, the fight over impoundments goes beyond technicalities; it reveals whether the country still lives by the separation of powers or is sliding toward executive rule.
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